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This article aims to establish the particularities of cybercrime in Nigeria and whether these
suggest problems with prevailing taxonomies of cybercrime. Nigeria is representative of
the Sub-Saharan region, and an exemplary cultural context to illustrate the importance of
incorporating social and contextual factors into cybercrime classiﬁcations. This paper
anchors upon a basic principle of categorisation alongside motivational theories, to offer a
tripartite conceptual framework for grouping cybercrime nexus. It argues that cybercrimes
are motivated by three possible factors: socioeconomic, psychosocial and geopolitical.
Whilst this contribution challenges the statistics relied on to inform the prevalence of
cybercrime perpetrators across nations, it provides new ways of making sense of the volu-
minous variances of cybercrime. Concomitantly, it enables a clearer conceptualisation of
cybercrime in Nigeria and elsewhere, because jurisdictional cultures and nuances apply
online as they do ofﬂine.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
This paper sets out with the aim of developing and improving upon existing taxonomies used in cybercrime scholarship.
Listed in prevalence of cybercrime perpetrators, Nigeria, the UK and the USA (in ascending order of signiﬁcance) are on top of
the ‘league table’ (Internet Crime Complaint Center - ICCC, 2006e2010). Considering Nigeria as an exemplary social contexte
representing the Sub-Saharan world region - this article will emphasise the need to incorporate social and contextual factors
into the classiﬁcation schemas. Whilst the establishing of the particularities of cybercrime in Nigeria will concomitantly
suggest problems with prevailing taxonomies of cybercrime, it will also render problematic, the basis for ICCC's (2006e2010)
claim on the prevalence of cybercrime perpetrators.
Whilst cybercrime primarily operates in the realm of cyberspace, terrestrial crimes operate in physical spaces (Manjikian,
2010). Seeking to summarise and encapsulate various conceptualisations within cybercrime literature, Yazdanifard et al.
(2011) deﬁned ‘cybercrime’ as ‘any type of intentional criminal scheme that is computer or/and internet-mediated’. How-
ever, whilst such a description describes a wide spectrum of cybercrime, it fails to account for the dual model of criminal
schemes within 1cyberspace. Ogwezzy (2012, p.91) elaborated that the term ‘cybercrime’ implies “offences committed
through the use of the computer in contrast to ‘computer crime’ which refers to offences against the computer and data ork.
or the globalization of threats as well as beneﬁts (Manjikian, 2010).
Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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crime is wrapped around the use of a computer or/and the Internet to commit age-old crimes (Ogwezzy, 2012; McGuire and
Dowling, 2013).
Conceptions of ‘computer crime’ and ‘cybercrime’ interpenetrate one another; their entities are intertwined and therefore
difﬁcult to disentangle. The intertwining of computer crime and cybercrime further challenges the simplistic rendering of
cyberspace and physical space as two different entities with easily deﬁned boundaries. Regarding ‘cybercrime’, there are over
30 types identiﬁed in existing literature, since cyberspace-crime linkage was ﬁrst constructed in cyberpunk stories (Wall,
2008). Most of them are listed in Table 1 below. These numerous variances are implicated in obscuring the effective con-
ceptualisation of ‘cybercrime’. Yet, whilst the existing dichotomised categories (Gordon and Ford, 2006; McGuire and
Dowling, 2013) adhere to the basic psychological principle of categorisation (Rosch, 1978), they fail to acknowledge the
roles of motivations in offending. Relatedly, when the existing motivational categories (Chawki et al., 2015a; Wall, 2013) do
consider the motivational element of offending, they take for granted the basic psychological principle of categorisation.
Insights from Rosch's (1978, p.28) general and basic principles for the formation of categories stipulate that:“the task of category systems is to provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort [and] the perceived
world comes as structured information rather than as arbitrary attributes. Thus maximum information with least
cognitive effort is achieved if categories map the perceived world structure as closely as possible. This condition can be
achieved either by the mapping of categories to given attribute structures or by the deﬁnition or redeﬁnition of at-
tributes to render a given set of categories appropriately structured”.In line with motivational theories framed within the basic psychological framework of categorisation, this current
endeavour will, ﬁrstly, aim not only to complement the existing categories but also offer a more conceptually robust
framework for grouping cybercrime. The implication being that whilst cybercrimes constitute a global problem, recognising
the limits of a ‘one size ﬁts all’ binary of taxonomies is of utmost importance. Secondly, Nigeria will be presented as an
exemplary cultural context to illustrate certain aspects of these limitations (binary model) and the importance of social/
contextual factors in the classiﬁcation schemas. Through the precise delineation of the particularities of cybercrime in Nigeria,
this article aims to determine the extent to which this exemplar problematises or contradicts prevailing taxonomies of
cybercrime. At its core, this paper has three research questions, which it will aim to answer: ﬁrstly, how useful are the existing
cybercrime taxonomies inmaking sense of social and contextual factors (such as the category of cybercrimes that the Nigerian
cybercriminals exclusively commit)? Secondly, since ‘cybercrime’ is a globalised phenomenon, how is the Nigerian case -
representing the Sub-Saharan region, any different fromWestern regions? Thirdly, what exactly is ‘cybercrime’ in a Nigerian
context?
2. A dual model of cybercrime
The word ‘cybercrime’ comprises a wide range of online crimes. For McGuire and Dowling (2013, p.5), “[C]yber-dependent
crimes are offences that can only be committed by using a computer, computer networks, or other forms of ICT [Information
and Communications Technology]” such as creation or/and distribution of malwares/viruses. On the other hand, cyber-
enabled crimes “can still be committed without the use of ICT00 such as cyber fraud. These dual categories are illustrated in
Fig. 1. Unlike traditional crimes however, one criminal scheme in the realm of cyberspace may involve multiple nations and
actors and even impact onmultiple nations simultaneously (Yazdanifard et al., 2011). Thuswhilst traditional crime tends to be
regarded locally, cybercrime is usually considered on a global scale (Yar and Jewkes, 2010). For example, if a person in Russia
creates computer ‘viruses/malwares’ while another person in Nigeria rents it to send credit scam e-mails and a third party in
the USA transfers funds using the illegally acquired data, (Wall, 2013), all three individuals are implicated in different strandsTable 1
Tripartite cybercrime framework (TCF).
Socioeconomic cybercrime Psychosocial cybercrime Geopolitical cybercrime
*Hackers and crackers *Hackers and crackers *Hackers -‘Hacktivist’
Cyber fraud Child pornography Cyber spies
Cyber embezzlement Cyber stalking Cyber espionage
Cyber piracy Cyber bullying ***Cyber terrorism
Cyber blackmail Revenge porn Cyber Vandalism
Romance scam Cyber rape Cyber assault
Online drug trafﬁcking *Cyber hate speech *Cyber hate speech
Cyber prostitution *Cyber extortion Cyber riot
*Cyber extortion Obscenity Cyber sabotage
Illegal online gambling *Cyber-prostitution Cyber-colonialism
*Cyber Trespass *Cyber Trespass Cyber rebellion
***Cyber terrorism *Cyber homicide
***Cyber terrorism
*Where the type of cybercrime appears in more than one column.
***Where the type of cybercrime appears in more than two columns.
Fig. 1. The binary model of cybercrime.
S. Ibrahim / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 47 (2016) 44e5746of cybercrime. Whilst all three actors are motivated by monetary beneﬁts, they are in fact involved in cyberspace in varying
degrees. The virus/malware creator has committed a cyber-dependent offence, whereas the other two have committed cyber-
enabled offences. This existing trafﬁc between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent categories clearly illustrates the
complexity of cybercrime and how one criminal act can impact on multiple nations and involve various networks of actors
simultaneously.
Closely related to cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent categories are ‘techno-centric (type I) and people-centric (type II)
subsets’. Gordon and Ford (2006, p.15) speciﬁcally posited that techno-centric and people-centric cybercrime are at the
opposite ends of a continuum; dichotomising cybercrime based on the strength of the cyber-element versus people-
component of the criminal act in question. They distinguished Type I (techno-centric) crimes such as e-commerce fraud,
cyber-vandalism, data manipulations through hacking, phishing, from Type II (people-centric) crimes such as cyber fraud,
cyber bullying and cyber-stalking as illustrated in Fig. 1. The latter being less technologically oriented than the former and
therefore grounded in perpetrator-victim interactions. These binary models (people-centric and techno-centric; cyber-
enabled and cyber-dependent), anchoring on a basic psychological principle of categorisation, have no doubt offered a useful
tool in looking at voluminous cybercrime variances.
However, motivational elements are not conﬁgured in the properties of these binary typologies. As a result, they are ill-
equipped to differentiate between the psychological-motivated cybercrimes such as cyber stalking and cyber bullying from
ﬁnancially motivated ones such as cyber fraud and cyber embezzlement. Simply put, they have taken for granted the
motivational lens of looking at cybercrime, which renders them unable to answer a simple question: how exactly is a digital
crime that is primarily geared towards defrauding a person or a group of persons, different to another online scheme intended
to fundamentally disrupt a person's psychological state of mind? It is essential to isolate the primary motive behind
cybercrimes in the meaning-making of what any particular cybercrime is in a given context, as illustrated in Table 2 below.
It is reasonable therefore to argue for grouping cybercrimes according to criminals' motivations. This could and would
sharpen the distinction between cybercrimes that are rooted in ﬁnancial gains such as cyber fraud, and psychologically
motivated cybercrimes such as cyber stalking. However, conceptually, the above binary models appear to be ‘explanatory-
tools’, which cannot capture the differences between cybercrimes primarily driven by ﬁnancial rewards and cybercrimes
fundamentally propelled by psychological beneﬁts as shown in Table 2. Based on these rationales, it is reasonable to com-
plement these models - ‘techno-centric and people-centric (Gordon and Ford, 2006) and cyber-enabled crime and cyber-
dependent (McGuire and Dowling, 2013). That said, the existing motivational categories, despite usefulness in acknowl-
edging the motivational element of cybercrime, have their limitations too.3. Some existing motivational taxonomies
In endorsing motivational categories, Chawki et al. (2015a, p.16e17) argued that it is crucial to understand a person's
proﬁle in the case of a particular cybercrime. Particular educational attainment, occupation and childhood experiences, he
Table 2
Perpetrators' beneﬁts and victims' losses.
Attacker/attacked Socioeconomic Psychosocial Geopolitical
Perpetrator (primary beneﬁts) Economic gain Psychological gain Geopolitical, economic & psychological
losses
Victim (primary loss) Economic loss Psychological distress Geopolitical, economic & psychological
losses
Perpetrators (secondary
beneﬁts)
Both economic & psychological
gains
Psychological gain Geopolitical, economic & psychological
gains
Victim (secondary loss) Both economic & psychological
losses
Both economic & psychological
losses
Geopolitical, economic & psychological
losses
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cybercriminals can be categorized as: [a] children and adolescents [b] organized hackers [c] professional hackers [d]
discontent employees. Whilst Chawki et al.’s (2015a) categories tell us about different levels of sophistication involved in
offending (e.g., professional hackers and organized hackers), they also reveal the extent towhich cybercriminals could be age-
graded.
However, cross-cultural insights from young offenders have pointed out that age is not lived similarly across cultures and
age-related behaviours are constituted differently across cultures (Brathwaite, 1996; Cain, 2000). For example, in line with
Tade and Aliyu's (2011) sociological work in Nigeria and Armstrong's (2011) anthropological analysis in Ghana, most ‘young
people’ in Nigerian and Ghanaian universities involved in cybercrime in general are involved in cyber fraud in particular. In
contrast, studies on Canadian undergraduates (Cunningham et al., 2014; Faucher et al., 2014) university students in the USA
(Lindsay and Krysik, 2012) ‘young people’ in Finland (Oksanen and Keipi, 2013) and higher education students in Britain
(Benson et al., 2015; Boulton et al., 2012) suggest that young people in Canada, Finland, the USA, and Britain e the Western
world region, are more involved in psychological-oriented cybercrime such as cyber bullying and cyber harassment than
cyber-fraud. The key point is that “young people” as a category is insensitive to the differentiation between ‘what is true of all
societies’ and ‘what is true of one society at one point in time and space’ (Nelken, 2010). Another limitation is that, Chawki
et al.’s (2015a) taxonomy does not adhere to the basic principles of categorisation.
In a similar vein, Wall 2007 (2013, p.62e65) proposed seven different motivational subsets, based on: self-satisfaction; the
need for peer respect; to impress potential employers; criminal gain or commercial advantage; revenge; distance fromvictim;
politically motivated protest. These motivational signposts help to illustrate that the speciﬁc motivations behind cybercrime
are diverse. An equally important issue is that the seven subsets for cyber offenders, as revealed by their titles, shedmore light
on the drives, the ‘push and pull factors’ of cybercriminals to cybercrime (Wall, 2013). The value of this grouping is most
evident in the ‘criminal gain or commercial advantage’, and ‘politically motivated’ categories. For example, whilst some types
of cybercrime such as cyber extortion, cyber fraud and cyber embezzlement ﬁt squarely under the canopy of the former, cyber
espionage, cyber terrorism, cyber rebellion, can be located smoothly in the sphere of the latter.
There is however, a primary limitation of this taxonomy, as aforementioned, in that it neglects the basic principle of cat-
egorisation. Some of the proposed groups, such as ‘distance from the victim’, involve almost all types of cybercrime. Indeed,
‘distance from the victim’ is a speciﬁc aspect ofmost cybercrimes as Brown (2001) intimated in the analysis of cost-beneﬁts and
economics of criminal conducts. Similarly, ‘self-satisfaction’ - rooted in the utilitarian maximisation principle - may be in the
form of tangible things such asmonetary reward or intangible ones such as psychological thrill. Eitherway, ‘self-satisfaction’ is
integral to almost all types of cybercrime, and arguably does not seem to represent a speciﬁc category of cybercrimes.
In the same vein, ‘revenge’ as a category could be the driver of cyber stalking, cyber fraud, or hacking. Whilst ‘revenge’may
be a principal impetus behind this range of cybercrimes, it requires a lot of cognitive effort to see the ‘rope’ that binds them
together as a distinct subset. ‘Thus maximum information with least cognitive effort is only achievable if categories map the
perceived world structure as closely as possible’ (Rosch, 1978, p.28). The crux is that existing motivational categories (Chawki
et al., 2015a; Wall, 2013) have ignored a basic psychological principle of categorisation (Rosch, 1978, p.28): ‘to simplify a
complex set of data and increase information intake with the least cognitive effort’.
4. The tripartite cybercrime framework (TCF)
In complementing the above taxonomies, this current endeavour anchors on the basic psychological principles of cate-
gorisation alongside motivational insights to offer a 2tripartite-cybercrime-framework (TCF). An individual is said to be
motivated when such an individual is moved, energised, or inspired to do something (Deci and Ryan, 2011, 2000, 1985).
Motivation is orientation graded; it varies according to the underlying variable behind the actions in question. It can also vary
in terms of the intensity of occurrence, i.e., whether a person is highly motivated or otherwise. Whilst the latter centers on the
amount or size of impetus behind the action, the former is concerned with the reason for the action. Arguably motivation can
be conceptualised as the foundation of most crimes; it is reasonable therefore to offer a social/contextual basis for the2 This article uses the tripartite cybercrime framework (TCF) or the tripartite conceptual framework (TCF) interchangeably.
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- intrinsic and extrinsic, deﬁne the strength or intensity of motivation.
Motivation therefore can be schematised as a dual phenomenon; incorporating intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. This
binary model is necessary for the precision of illustrations and the discussion that follows. Whilst extrinsic motivation is the
doing of an activity solely to achieve a distinct result, intrinsic motivation is the demonstration of actions inherently for the
mere satisfaction of doing them (Deci and Ryan, 2011; 1985). For example, a poet is more likely to write poems for the
inherent satisfaction of such an activity rather than for the approval of his/her parents e intrinsic motivation; whereas a
student is more likely to study hard for good grades and a better future e extrinsic motivation. The majority of activities are
generally propelled by extrinsic motivation, i.e., people fundamentally motivated to do something due to the direct and
expected consequence of their actions (Deci and Ryan, 2011; 1985).
However, as Kshetri (2006), in describing cybercriminals e hackers e emphasised, intrinsic motivation may have a su-
perior impact compared to extrinsic motivation. This paper conceptualises extrinsic and intrinsic motivations of cyber crimes
as twin interlocking entities, which are difﬁcult to disentangle, and, as Wehmeyer and Little (2009) note, extrinsically
motivated behaviours can parallel intrinsically motivated activities if actors internalise their actions, and experience ﬂow in
their activities. Nevertheless, Layous et al. (2013) pointed out that intrinsically motivated people aremore likely to experience
ﬂow than those who are extrinsically motivated. Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p.95) deﬁned ﬂow as “the balance of
challenges and skills when both are above average levels for the individual”. This suggests that it is a state of profound task-
absorption and task-enjoyment experience, most likely to condition the actor involved to lose sense of time in doing the task
in question (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 2000, 2014). Flow experience has the following nine components: [a] Clarity of goals at
every stage [b] Availability of immediate feedback [c] a balance between challenges and skills [d] Interpenetrations of action
and awareness [e] Limited distractions from consciousness [f] Absence of concern in terms of failure [g] The disappearance of
self-consciousness [h] The distortion of sense of time [i] The activity is autotelic (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 2000, 2014).
Arguably, ﬂow experience is crucial to the understanding of cybercrime motivations.
Given that the type of primarymotivation behind an actionmatters in relation to the opposing forces that could inhibit the
intended action, underlines the importance of incorporating social factors into classiﬁcation schemas. This paper also ac-
knowledges that certain types of cybercrimes listed in Table 1 ﬁt into two or moremotivational categories. Although there are
some degrees of overlap between the categories, the primary motivation behind the action is the basic tool to differentiate
between types of cybercrimes. For example, whilst cyber fraud is under the socioeconomic cybercrime category, revenge porn
is under the umbrella of psychosocial cybercrime, as illustrated in Table 1. Theoretically therefore, in complementing the
existing categories, this paper provides amore reﬁnedmotivational taxonomy based on perpetrators' primary beneﬁts as well
as victims' primary loss, as shown in Table 2.
As Tables 1 and 2 fundamentally illustrate, in socioeconomic cybercrimes, the perpetrator often has a direct contact with
his/her victim; this can be deﬁned as ﬁnancially motivated crimes that are computer or/and internet-mediated, such as online
fraud, romance scam, and e-embezzlement. Psychosocial cybercrime are cybercrimes, which are principally psychologically
driven such as cyber stalking, cyber harassment and cyber rape. Whilst socioeconomic cyber criminals may aim to deﬂate the
economy of their victims, psychosocial cyber criminals focus fundamentally on inﬂicting psychological distress (full analysis
of the implications of the TCF, can be found further down).
Yet there remains a considerable amount of similarity between the two loose categories. Unlike the viewpoint that not all
actors are economically motivated (Hayward, 2007), the analysis of the motivational drives and economic decision-making in
relation to crime in general is more reﬁned (Farrell, 2010). According to Farrell (2010), the application of utility maximisation
rather than monetary beneﬁt or economic maximisation is a more appropriate term to deploy in conceptualising the general
costs and beneﬁts of crime. Hence, psychological beneﬁts, including expressive emotional elements and sensations, are critical
in determining if crime is economically motivated or not. Flowing from the above, different primary motivations underpin
different types of cybercrimes identiﬁed in literature e listed in Table 1. Collaterally, victims of cybercrimes may suffer
differently based on the primary motivation - the perpetrators of cybercrime in question as shown in Table 2. Therefore, this
current paper proposes that cybercrimes aremotivated in three different ways: socioeconomic, psychosocial and geopolitical.
In terms of the penetrator-victim transactions, the primary driving forces behind cyber bullying, online harassment and
cyber stalking are psychological in nature. Unlike fraud-based cybercrimes, the injuries as well as the beneﬁts lie within the
realm of the mind. The above distinction is not to suggest that acquisitive motivations involved in ﬁnancial crimes are
absolutely non-psychological. Insights from health psychology (Lazarus, 2006; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, 1984b) support
the fact that ﬁnancial loss (e.g. due to cyber fraud) can manifest physiologically as distress. However, the key element of
differentiation between socioeconomic and psychosocial categories is that the primary beneﬁts of the perpetrators as well as
the primary losses of victims are different, as illustrated in Table 2. In contrast, under the binary model discussed above, both
socioeconomic and psychosocial cybercrimes are grouped as one, that is, cyber-enabled crimes. Whereas the lens of the TCF
can further differentiate between the two, as well as a third category: geopolitical (as discussed further below).
For example, when these 3cybercriminals deploy the ‘Freestyle trick’ using accounts on dating sites to befriend/condition
unsuspecting victims to the point that they ‘fall in love’ with them and support them ﬁnancially, the victims of Nigerian3 The ‘Freestyle trick’ is a preferred/common method of operation among the early career cybercriminals in Nigeria, possibly because it is the simplest one
among multitude of others.
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petrators is commercial gain. In terms of the predicament of victims, economic losses are more grounded in the quantiﬁable
realm than psychosocial cybercrimes that are in the sphere of the mind.
On the other hand, geopolitical cybercrimes can be deﬁned as those e-crimes that involve agents of statecraft or/and
industrial representatives (e.g. cyber espionage). Yet even geopolitical cybercrimes constitute some elements of socioeco-
nomic and psychological cybercrimes as illustrated in Table 2. For example, Hacktivists, primarily aiming to make a political
statement could expose sensitive data from the law enforcement agencies and their actions could have economic, psycho-
social and geopolitical consequences on a person or group of people. The collective consequences of the tripartite categories
could lead to a security fault, which this paper calls ‘cyber insecurity’, deﬁned as a situation where security mechanisms in
both the existing cyberspace and physical space cannot guarantee perfect security, nor have the full capacity to resist and
respond to both intentional and unintentional cyberspace threats and hazards. In terms of victim-perpetrator interaction,
while socioeconomic and psychosocial cybercrimes are fundamentally engineered and executed on individual levels,
geopolitical cybercrimes, broadly speaking, are actions of state agents, groups of individuals against other groups, nations or
industrial entities acting on behalf of more complex statecraft or vested interests. In other words, each groupe especially but
not limited to, socioeconomic and psychosocial cybercrimes - may involve individual actors or group actors as both targets
and perpetrators. A crucial element of these categories e as illustrated in Table 2, is their capacity to simplify complex sets of
information, given that there are over 30 types of cybercrimes identiﬁed in the existing literature. The TCF also help to
enhance our understanding of ‘cybercriminals’, and their geopolitical, socioeconomic and psychosocial factors. Another
signiﬁcant issue is that, unless they go against the grain that constitutes ‘normality’ in their home country, agents of statecraft
that commit geopolitical cybercrimes are rarely considered ‘criminals’ at all. The assumption underpinning this is that they
represent authority, rather than subversion. Therefore it is the nation they represent that is categorized as criminal, unlike
individual subcultural rule breakers such as the Nigerian 4419 cybercriminals.
5. What is ‘cybercrime’ in Nigeria?
Drawing on the TCF as shown in Tables 1 and 2, the focus of this discourse conﬁnes itself to an examination of Nigeria e
representing the Sub-Saharan region, as an exemplary cultural context. It is critical therefore to underscore the peculiar
economic-beneﬁt induced trend of cybercrime in Nigeria - generalisable to other Sub-Saharan nations such as 5Ghana, which
may not represent squarely the hydra-headed nature of cybercrime in Western societies. Although there are multiple vari-
ations on how ‘419 fraud’ happens (e.g. Adogame, 2007; Igwe, 2007; Aransiola and Asindemade, 2011; FBI, 2016), monetary
beneﬁt is central to the Nigerian 419 fraud as illustrated in Fig. 2 (for fuller accounts on how 419 happens, see the above
authors). Although cybercrime is a global phenomenon, in most Western nations, in addition to socioeconomic cybercrime,
the term cybercrime represents a range of computer/Internet-mediated crimes under the umbrella of psychosocial and
geopolitical cybercrimes e see Tables 1 and 2. Couched within the aim of establishing the particularities of cybercrime in
Nigeria is a wider critique of prevailing taxonomies of cybercrime. Nigerian cybercriminals to date, have been consistently
implicated in money-oriented rather than psychosocial and geopolitical cybercrimes. In fact, the convergence of emerging
evidence reinforces that perpetrators of cybercrimes in Nigeria focus exclusively on cyber-fraud (Ojedokun and Eraye, 2012;
Smith, 2008; Tade and Aliyu, 2011; Adogame, 2007; Doyon-Martin, 2015; Chawki et al., 2015b; Akpome, 2015; Ellis, 2016;
Ibrahim, 2016). Arguably, the Nigerian 419 fraud invented and revolutionalised by Nigerian kingpins such as Fred Ajudua
(Longe et al., 2010) is rooted in socioeconomics.
Given the foregoing remarks, cybercrime in Nigeria can be conceptualised simply as the use of computer/Internet to
commit fraud. According to the yardstick of the binary model, the use of computer/Internet to commit fraud falls under the
scaffolding of cyber-enabled crime (see Fig. 1). Unlike ICCC's (2010) survey, which concentrated mainly on a range of 6cyber-
enabled crimes as shown in Table 3, some recent enquiries which focused exclusively on cyber-dependent crimes could not
locate Nigeria at the upper part of the cybercrime perpetrators' hierarchy (e.g. Kaspersky, 2016). This comparison between
these observations support the notion that Nigerian cybercriminals are more implicated in cyber-enabled than cyber-
dependent (or techno-centric cybercrime) listed in Fig. 1. Does this not suggest problems with prevailing taxonomies of
cybercrime?
If we look at the Nigerian case through the lens of the binary model (see Fig. 1), the problem is that we would be led to
conclude that cybercrime in Nigeria is just cyber-enabled. Cybercrime in Nigeria is fundamentally rooted in socioeconomics,
whereas the cyber-enabled crime framework encompasses a range of other crimes such cyber-bullying and cyber rape. This is
problematic. In terms of cyber-bullying and cyber rape, the perpetrators' gains and the victims' losses, as illustrated in Table 2,
are primarily psychosocial unlike cyber-fraud (which is primarily rooted in economic gains/losses). It suggests problems with4 “419 is coined from section 419 of the Nigerian criminal code (part of Chapter 38: Obtaining Property by false pretences; Cheating) dealing with fraud.
Nowadays, the axiom ‘419’ generally refers to a complex list of offences which in ordinary parlance are related to stealing, cheating, falsiﬁcation, imper-
sonation, counterfeiting, forgery and fraudulent representation of facts” (Chawki et al., 2015b, pp.129).
5 ‘Nigeria and Ghana are Anglophone Sub-Saharan nations separated and surrounded by Francophone nations. Despite multiple ethnic variations within
and across these two countries, they have similarities: British colonisation, English language, relatively, similar time of independence’ (Ibrahim, 2015, p.
312).
6 Cyber-enabled crime and people-centric cybercrime will henceforth be interchangeably used.
Table 3
Top ten types of cybercrime covered by ICCC (2010).
Type Percentage Deﬁnitions
1. Non-delivery
Merchandise
21.1% Purchaser did not receive items purchased, or seller did not receive payment for items
2. FBI-Related Scams 16.6% Scams in which a criminal poses as the FBI to defraud victims
3. Identity Theft 10.1% Unauthorised use of victim's personally identifying information to commit fraud
4. Computer Crimes 9.3% 1) Crimes that target computer networks or devices directly
2) Crimes facilitated by computer networks or devices
5. Miscellaneous
Fraud
7.7% Variety of scams meant to defraud the public such as work-at-home scams and fraudulent contests
6. Advance Fee Fraud 6.1% Criminals convince victims to pay a fee to receive something of value, but do not deliver anything of value to the
victim
7. Spam 4.1% Mass-produced, unsolicited bulk messages
8. Auction 4.0% Fraudulent transactions that occur in the context of an online auction
9. Credit Card Fraud 3.6% Fraudulent, unauthorised charging of goods and services to a victim's credit card
10. Overpayment
Fraud
3.4% An incident in which the complainant receives an invalid monetary instrument with instructions to deposit it in a
bank account and send the deposited money back to the sender
Fig. 2. How the Nigerian 419 happens.
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economic gains/loss (as illustrated in Table 2). In other words, whilst socioeconomic cybercrime constitutes only a sub-
category of cyber-enabled crime, a cyber-enabled conceptual framework comprises a range of crimes other than cyber-
fraud. Therefore, clearly, the existing binary categories discussed above are ill equipped to differentiate between psychoso-
cial, socioeconomic and geopolitical cybercrime. The crux is that the evidence that support the centrality of socioeconomic
cybercrime in Nigeria, concomitantly suggest problems with the dual model of cybercrime. These illustrations highlight the
usefulness or utility of the TCF, which is more robust than the prevailing taxonomies in dealing with the complexities of
numerous varieties of cybercrime.
6. Internet crime complaint centre: the critique of evidence
Having offered a theoretical critique of the prevailing models of cybercrime, this article will render problematic the basis
for 7ICCC's (2006e2010) claim on ‘cybercrime perpetrators’ league table’, i.e., Nigeria being the third worst nation in the
world. The FBI in partnership with the National White Collar Crime Center, aiming to reduce the volume of economic loss by7 It is noteworthy that unlike ICCC's (2006e2010), ICCC (2011e2014) reports exclude the perpetrators' league table.
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center to receive victims' complaints concerning ‘cybercrime’ and over the past years, the ICCC received about 300,000 re-
sponses annually (ICCC, 2008; ICCC, 2009; ICCC, 2010; ICCC, 2011; ICCC, 2012; ICCC, 2013; ICCC, 2014; FBI, 2015). These data
appear to be robust because they come directly from the people who experience the offence. However, the accuracy of re-
sponses were only self-reportedly measured, which highlights the ICCC's over-reliance on participants' honesty and accuracy.
Secondly, given that it is only a small percentage of people who voluntarily report themselves as victims of cybercrime
(Bohme and Moore, 2012) or crime in general (Reiner, 2010), the generalisability of the populist claim is questionable. In fact,
according to the FBI (2014), less than 10% of people report themselves as victims of cybercrime globally. Apart from cyber-
crime being underreported, the vast bulk of cybercrime as Brenner (2007) and Brenner (2012) pointed out, is undetected.
Arguably, even if an average of 300,000 respondents could be seen as a huge sample size in itself, it is far from being
representative of the general population of all victims of cybercrime on earth. Additionally, there is the possibility that a
majority of responses obtained by the ICCC may represent a selective group. For example, people who perceive themselves as
‘victims’ of the law are unlikely to channel their predicaments to the FBI. Also, Asian and African populations in the ICCC's
global research were not signiﬁcantly represented in comparison to North American and European populations. As Stevens
(2011, p.9) reminded us, “statistics, even when they represent the underlying reality, are socially and selectively constructed,
and cannot (or should not) simply speak for themselves”. Therefore, regarding the cases that come to light, even if their
statistical basis should be taken at face value, the claim is far from straightforward. A league table therefore is a pictorial
representation of that construction, which not only renders invisible the process of construction, but also obscures the en-
tirety of what it represents.
Thirdly, whilst the media and the political discourses tend to amplify the moral panic on the Nigerian 419 fraud (e.g.
Adogame, 2007), Akpome (2015), in ‘unsettling the myth of Nigerian exceptionalism’ contended, there is an impossibility of
knowing if every cyber-criminal using the Nigerian 419 letter/email templates is actually a 8Nigerian citizen. It is reasonable
also to point out that, there is an impossibility of knowing if some of those perpetrators grouped as ‘Americans’ or ‘British’ are
not citizens of other nations. The key point here is that it is challenging to isolate cybercriminals from other nations andworld
regions who may have as Adogame (2007, p.7) pointed out, ‘masked themselves as Nigerians and entered the theatre of 419
fraud as actors’. One of the implications is that, as Reiner (2010) noted, most people depend on the media, law enforcement
agencies and politicians for ‘authentic’ information on issues such as crime. Regarding the Nigerian case, bearing in mind that
some victims may not have accurate information about the actual perpetrators' identities, suggests that the media and po-
litical rhetoric on the ‘Nigerian’ fraud letter/emails may have unintended knock-on-effects on some victims reporting
cybercriminals disproportionately as Nigerians. Given that ‘there is a long-standing demonisation of Nigeria in the West as
being full of criminals’ (Agozino, 2003, p. 231) reinforces the notion that the ICCC's league table framed with a loose term
‘cybercrime perpetrators’ may have factored and impacted on some victims' perceptions.
Lastly, as shown in Table 3, over 90% of crimes covered (2006e2010) were primarily ‘cyber-fraud’ and under this speciﬁc
category (which this article called socioeconomic cybercrime), Nigeria was found to be the third worst nation. Could the
outcome be any different if geopolitical and psychosocial categories were covered? Given the limitations of the binary model,
could the effect of the ICCC's report on various discourses be any different if the exclusion of geopolitical and psychosocial
categories were made explicitly? This highlights the usefulness of the tripartite framework as it helps to simplify such league-
table-claim into a nuanced umbrella (e.g. socioeconomic cybercrime). Unlike the popular representation of the ICCC's report
in various discourses such as the media (e.g. ‘Nigeria ranked third in the world for cybercrime’ in Balancing Act, 2014), if we
should view ICCC's (2006e2010) reports through the lens of the TCF, we could interpret it differently: ‘cybercrimes are
motivated by three possible factors: socioeconomic, psychosocial and geopolitical. As regards to the socioeconomic category,
Nigeria was found to rank third in the world’. The term ‘cybercrime’ embodies multiple strands of crimes other than the
socioeconomic category.
7. Further justiﬁcations for the usefulness of the TCF
In turn, this paper has developed another scope for categorizing cybercrime (TCF), having critiqued the prevailing tax-
onomies and rendered problematic the statistics relied on to inform the prevalence of cybercrime perpetrators across nations.
Accordingly, it will henceforth offer further justiﬁcations for the usefulness of the TCF. One of the implications is that if the
ICCC's reports and the likes are framed with TCF, the outcomes could be most precise. Concurrently, both the immediate
outcomes and their subsequent knock-on-effects could be different and to a great extent, less ambiguous.
Let us suppose, hypothetically, that river A, B and C have between them the greatest numbers of ‘animals’ (ﬁshes and
reptiles) in the world: river A has 4000 ﬁshes, and 2000 reptiles, river B has 2000 ﬁshes and 8000 reptiles, river C has 3000
ﬁshes and 6000 reptiles. If we were required to count the numbers of all the ‘animals’ in them and reported only our ﬁndings
about ﬁsh, without applying the basic categorisation of ‘animals’ already in place, which includes reptiles as well as ﬁsh, we
could and would be led to say that: ‘regarding animals that live only in water, river A has 2000 more animals than river B and
1000 animals more than river C’. By the same token, river A, river C and river Be in descending order of signiﬁcance, have the8 For example, the ﬁrst known exponent of the present day 419 fraud, a former employee of Marine Department of the colonial government of Lagos in
1920 e ‘Professor’ Crentsil, came from Ghana (Ellis, 2016).
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animals in theworldwhen it is only in ‘ﬁsh’ category that river A is dominant. River B and river C both havemore animals than
river A in terms of the other category of animals called ‘reptiles’. In fact, regarding the overall population of animals in these
three rivers, in an ascending order of rank, river A, C, and B have the greatest number of animals in theworld. This information
is made easy because categories map the perceived world structure closely. The TCF could help to showcase data in a clear
light by funneling information into nuanced umbrellas.
Beyond abstraction, TCF could be useful in policy-making processes, given that to simplify a complex set of data and
maximise information intake with the least mental effort are at the heart of the TCF. The utilitarian value of the TCF could
translate into policy-making processes because the instruments of persuasion in policy-making arenas, are often constructed
with ‘killer-charts’ rather than elaborate text and analysis. ‘Many policy documents transmitted between policy making civil
servants are mostly characterised by bullet points and simple diagrams e they do not grant lengthy analysis of imprecise
nature of knowledge’ (Stevens, 2011, p.9). Arguably, bearing in mind the forgoing remarks on the nature of policy-making
operational-practice, the TCF could be a useful ‘story telling’ tool in the hands of policy makers. This speciﬁc usefulness of
the TCF emphasises that a robust taxonomy in cybercrime scholarship is by no means a sign of regress but on the contrary, an
indication of progress.
Furthermore, given that everyone who may be interested in cybercrime reports may not be an ‘expert’ in cybercrime, the
TCF would provide a simpliﬁed tool of making sense of the complexities around the conceptualisation of cybercrime. Simply
put, the TCF would have helped to showcase the statistical results of the ICCC's endeavours (and other cybercrime oriented
undertakings) in a clearer light. In turn, it reinforces the elementary principles and the psychological beneﬁts of catego-
risation (Rosch,1978), which is central to the TCF. Therefore, the inability to differentiate between socioeconomic, geopolitical
and psychosocial cybercrime is not a feature of the binary models alone: it limits the precision and clarity of ICCC's
(2008e2010) reports as well. The crux is that the ICCC's umbrella term: ‘cybercrime’ or ‘cybercrime perpetrators’ is
ambiguous and misleading at best.
It is not only misleading: it has consequences on the emerging academic discourse in Nigeria over the years. Speciﬁcally, it
has inﬂuenced the framing of most scholarly endeavours in Nigeria (e.g. Adomi and Igun, 2008), which echo a sense of ‘moral
panic’ on ‘419’ phenomenon. Relatedly, the ICCC's reports could be implicated in supplying ‘ammunitions’ to ‘Western pro-
paganda machinery, which often blows the Nigerian 419 fraud-news out of proportion’ (Adogame, 2007, p.7). Given that
repeating discourses normalise their claim, the problem is deep. Whilst there is a total absence of social/contextual taxon-
omies in cybercrime scholarship, it is not difﬁcult to notice the presence of ‘league tables’ as well as the binary models
discussed above. This mismatch could be implicated in the uncritical representation of ‘Nigeria as the third worst nation’ in
cybercrime literature (Aransiola and Asindemade, 2011; Adomi and Igun, 2008). Based on the premise that conceptualising
cybercrime is challenging, this article therefore aims to stimulate contemporary scholarly endeavours from Nigeria and
elsewhere to look beyond the ‘league tables’ and the binarymodels and consider contextual/social nuances at play. This is one
of the usefulness of the TCF as it has the capacity to enable a clearer conceptualisation of cybercrime in Nigeria and beyond.
Unlike geopolitical and psychosocial categories, socioeconomic cybercrime is prevalent in Nigeria. Bearing in mind that
the recognition of the socio-cultural fabric elements of a given situation is at the core of this paper, reinforces its value. The
over-reliance on the populist ‘league table’ and the binarymodels in cybercrime scholarship has led some authors (e.g. Adomi
and Igun, 2008; Chawki et al., 2015b) to overlook jurisdictional cultures and nuances. It has possibly misled some people in
policy arenas. As Lagazio et al. (2014) observed, the orchestration of the fear of cybercrime in itself stimulates over-spending
on defense measures as strategic responses by various states. Hyped rates of cybercrime in Nigeria by various discourses
(academic, media) framed with the limitations of the prevailing taxonomies above have possibly inﬂuenced people in policy-
making arenas. These conditions could be implicated in having knock-on-effects as AllAfrica (2013) pointed out, on the rise of
the Nigerian government's budgets/expenses on cyber security oriented issues. Bearing in mind that there is a general
‘paranoia’ on the social ‘problem’ of Nigerian criminals (e.g. Agozino, 2003; Adogame, 2007), the concerns of international
communities could creep into regional policy responses against the cybercrime ‘problem’. In turn, international communities'
concerns help to stretch the already over-stretched Nigerian expenses on a wide spectrum of cybercrime problem. The TCF
would not only help to question the taken-for-granted assumptions on Nigerian cybercriminals' position on the global map,
but also help policymakers to funnel down resources to copewith the speciﬁc category where Nigeria is most vulnerable. The
key point is that the beneﬁts of the TCF in coping with the complexities around cybercrime conceptualisation, outweigh that
of the prevailing cybercrime taxonomies.
8. Historical perspectives: the Nigerian 419 fraud
Having problematised ICCC's (2006e2010) claim, it is worth considering the background to the Nigerian 419 fraud. ‘Scam’
is an age-old game in all human societies and the Nigerian 419 fraud, like its historical antecedents such as the Spanish
Prisoner Swindle (Ogwezzy, 2012; Whitaker, 2013), has emerged from a particular history. Therefore, to dismiss long-term
historical perspectives is vulnerable to omit critical factors necessary to understand the social and contextual platforms on
which ‘419 fraud’ has emerged. The underlying idea is to further develop the socioeconomic theory of Nigerian cybercriminals
e answer to the question, what is cybercrime in Nigeria? Historically, socioeconomic cybercrime in contemporary Nigerian
society metamorphised as Igwe (2007) narrated, from various types of deceptive ‘games’ played in pre-colonial Nigeria. Like
all human societies, the contemporary Nigerian society that has sprouted from the ruins of three ancient West African
Fig. 3. Cultural relics of scam.
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scam-games of pre-colonial Nigeria are called the ancient relics of scam, as illustrated in Fig. 3 below. These relics of scammay
be conceptualised as ancient assemblages of beliefs and practices that have evolved over time and entangled with the
contemporary Nigerian democracy and politics, to become a common ‘toolbox’ for money success. Drawing from Robinson
and McAdams (2015), in order to communicate this theoretical position beyond abstraction, the relics of scam hypothesis
is simpliﬁed down to a set of verbal postulates, a box-and-arrow diagram e as illustrated in Fig. 3 below. One of the primary
rationales being to enhance our understanding with the least cognitive effort. During the colonial period in Nigeria, whilst
some commentators observed that ‘crime’ made little appeal to young Nigerians (e.g. Paterson, 1944), others noticed that
Nigerian schoolboys were very gifted in the psychology of manipulations (e.g. US Consulate 1949). It could be that the former
were referring to the general population of Nigerian youth, whereas the latter were referring to a speciﬁc group of young
Nigerians e those who had the opportunity to embrace Western education in the 1940s. Besides, a majority of these reports
on schoolboys were generated directly from their head teachers. The key point is that ‘schoolboys’ rather than ‘illiterates’
were principally implicated in authoring various kinds of letters, claiming as Ellis (2016) commented, to be sellers of di-
amonds, ivory, gold, and other exotic items from ‘Africa’, whereas they were the ‘Wayo trickers’ e fraudsters. However, the
‘destiny’ of ‘Wayo trickers’ changed drastically when petroleum was found in Nigeria (Adogame, 2007).
Petroleum was discovered in Nigeria four years prior to the ofﬁcial end of colonial rule in 1960. Consequently, petroleum
became the dominant pillar of the Nigerian economy (Adogame, 2007). In turn, as Saro-wiwa (1989, p.21) commented, most
political elites saw the oil-money as ‘a national cake, already baked, ready to be shared’. For them, ruling the nation has
nothing to dowith nation-building but has everything to dowith the funneling of federal money into personal bank accounts.
While corruption is a global phenomenon, there is a long-standing view that Nigeria is not one of the ‘cleanest’ nations in the
world (Transparency International, 2014). Although the petroleum boom has boosted the magnitude of corrupt practices in
Nigeria, it also has some beneﬁts.
As Smith (2008) described, the Nigerian petroleum boom was responsible for boosting the fertility rate as well as
increasing the inﬂow of foreign scholars and workers in the 1970s. Consequently, numbers of educated people in Nigeria
increased massively. However, nothing lasts indeﬁnitely, and in the 1980s the price of oil fell drastically, rapidly deﬂating the
Nigerian economy, but not corrupt practices. As oil boom became oil doom, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) entered
the equation. To paraphrase Adogame (2007, p.8) ‘IMF by prescribing deregulation exercises, austerity measures as the only
panacea to economic reconstruction, ensnared Nigeria into a vicious circle of perpetual money borrowing and interest
paying’. The misappropriation of these loans further deteriorated the economy. This was how the IMF, 9corrupt practices of
some politicians and political impunity became hopelessly interwoven with 419 fraud.9 For example, General Sanni Abacha, Nigerian president from 1993 to 1998 corruptly amassed a personal wealth of up to 4 billion USD (Igwe, 2007).
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IBB), the longest-serving Nigerian Military regime (1985e1993) supported 419 kingpins and beneﬁted directly from them.
IBB's alleged elevated bribery-corruption scheme, political impunity and a range of kickbacks between other politicians and
some foreign companies created real-life ‘scripts’, which added layers of authenticity to early 419 criminals' schemes. These
layers of authenticity made the Nigerian 419 fraud templates invaluable/attractive to swindlers e Nigerians and non-
Nigerians. It is easier for swindlers to modify/use the ‘authentic’ templates with track record of success, than to reinvent the
wheel of the game. In other words, many of the fraud templates originated from plausible, or even genuine, crime scenarios.
Evidently, as Adogame (2007) and Bretton (1962) observed, whilst numerous foreign companies found bribery and falsifying
of paper work as keys to beneﬁt from Nigeria, the politicians saw foreigners as a means of acquiring abundant wealth. The
marriage between them over the years has produced voluminous ‘419 fraud templates' and reinforces the idea that cyber-
crime in Nigeria is rooted in socioeconomics. As a result therefore of a sequence of events that interpenetrate one another to
worsen the state of the economy, unemployed graduates, predominantly male, became a part of the equation.
Given the condition of the Nigerian economy in the 1980s, it was not difﬁcult for most unemployed graduates to become
vulnerable to 419 scamming (e.g. Adogame, 2007; Smith, 2008). It could be that the petroleum boom in the 1970s provided an
elevated aspirational-level for university students. In consequence, higher expectations made the acceptance of
unemployment-induced destitution ‘harder’ for recent graduates than for control groups, that is, average unemployed in-
dividuals. This echoes the discrepancy theory of satisfaction (Michalos,1985) in positive psychology, which postulates that
upward social comparisons create a discrepancy between expectations and actual life events e upward social comparisons
are most likely to stimulate lesser rather than greater satisfaction (see also Cooper and Artz, 1995; Perales and Tomaszewski,
2015).
The ‘gap’ or discrepancy between expectations and actual rewards chieﬂy determines whether people have low or high
levels of satisfaction (Michalos, 1985; Cooper and Artz, 1995). However, this is not to concede that there is a causal rela-
tionship between unemployment and offending rates. The links between them despite showing some fairly clear patterns, are
far from straightforward (e.g. Newburn, 2016). The most consistent view is that online crimes (as well as terrestrial crimes) in
Nigeria aremale dominated (e.g. Ojedokun and Eraye, 2012; Aransiola and Asindemade, 2011). This is important becausemale
domination of cyber-fraud in Nigeria is linked to the socioeconomic cybercrime theory of Nigerian cyber-criminals, which, in
turn, suggests fundamental problems with the prevailing binary category of cybercrime.9. Socio-fabric elements and cultural landscapes
The explanations as towhy adult males in Nigeria have been implicated in the bulk of socioeconomic cybercrime demands
the application of cultural insights. The rationale being that there is an intersectionality of issues of interpersonal relation-
ships in physical spaces and cyberspace. Cultural constellations of people in social contexts affect people's activities in cy-
berspace. The centrality of socioeconomic cybercrime in Nigeria is linked to the centrality of the patriarchal system. As
Ibrahim (2015) pointed out, the strong patriarchal system and customary ‘common-sense’ in Nigeria among other factors,
encourage men culturally, unlike women, to be the breadwinners. Due to men's cultural positionality in society in relation to
women, men are generally more ‘desperate’ to achieve ﬁnancial success. Indeed, contemporary scholars articulate that some
cyber-criminals in the Sub-Saharan region go as far as deploying mystical/spiritual powers to enhance their exploits online
(e.g. Tade, 2013 in Nigeria; Armstrong, 2011 in Ghana). The key point here is that regarding cybercrime, the primary aims of
most Nigerian cyber-criminals converge on defrauding as many victims as possible (Smith, 2008; Akpome, 2015), which is
illustrative of socioeconomic cybercrime, rather than for example, psychosocial cybercrime (please see Table 2 for victim-
perpetrator primary and secondary loss/beneﬁts).
One of the considerations that shape this trend is the local philosophy and demonstrable reality that, if a man is ﬁnancially
successful, he has ‘unlimited’ privileges in multiple facets of life-domains, unlike inWestern society. For example, a manwho
has the means, regardless of his age, under customary and Islamic marriages can marry multiple wives. He can even marry
wives as young as fourteen or thirteen years old, in some cases, depending on his ‘tastes’ (Nigerian Marriage Act, 1990;
Ogunde, 2016; Monk et al. in press). Apart from the Nigerian common-sense custom allowing polygamy, a man's adultery
is socio-culturally perceived as ‘a heroic feat’ (Chinwuba, 2015, p.305). These types of relationships shapes the manner in
which a given society perceives its adult females at a particular historical point in time and howwomen are expected to relate
to adult males (Ajayi and Owumi, 2013; Ibrahim, 2015; Chinwuba, 2015; Ogunde, 2016). It also extends to future generations
and impacts on the children - the 10image-of-childhood in the Sub-Saharan region (Rwezaura, 1998; Ibrahim and Komulainen,
2016). A strong patriarchal system helps to perpetuate these types of cultural landscapes, which in turn shape the socio-
economic crime in Nigeria. Unlike in some Western nations, the cultural landscapes inherent in Nigeria invoke relatively
positive societal reactions, towards any man who has ﬁnancial success (irrespective of the source of such a success e e.g.
cyber-fraud) (see also Becker, 1967 on social reactions). Such background evidence reinforces that the Nigerian cyber crim-
inals' are primarily monetary-driven as illustrated in Table 2. Therefore, the Nigerian cybercriminals (popularly ranked third)10 The ‘image-of-childhood' refers broadly to the manner in which a given society perceives its children at a particular historical point in time and how
children are expected to relate to the adult world (Ibrahim and Komulainen, 2016).
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the lens of the binary model as the well as ICCC's (2008e2010) observations.
The above social and contextual factors informed the core of present day cybercrime in Nigeria. Arguably, these forms of
cultural landscapes are possibly the explanations for the centrality of socioeconomic cybercrime in Nigeria, which suggests
problems with the existing binary model of cybercrime as aforementioned. The implication is that what is cybercrime in
Britain or in the USA - ranked second and ﬁrst respectively, (ICCC, 2010) does not ﬁt squarelywithin the contextual meaning of
cybercrime in Nigeria. For instance, unlike the Sub-Saharan region, as Sheridan et al. (2014) pointed out, in most Western
nations, cyber stalking is a social problem. Another implication is that these social and contextual factors also challenge the
simplistic rendering of cyberspace and physical space as two different entities with easily deﬁned boundaries as they are
intertwined, as shown in Fig. 3. Evidently, the particularities of cybercrime in Nigeria support the incorporation of social and
contextual factors into cybercrime classiﬁcations and consequently, render problematic the existing taxonomies.
10. Conclusion
This article has aimed to establish the particularities of cybercrime in Nigeria and whether these suggest problems with
prevailing taxonomies of cybercrime. It has examined the explanatory capacity of the existing taxonomies in making sense of
what is true of all societies, and what is true of one society at one point in time and space. Thus, these analyses have helped to
propose that whilst in Nigeria, cybercrime is fundamentally rooted in socioeconomics, the lenses of the existing cybercrime
taxonomies are not well equipped to project the pattern of this phenomenon clearly. Therefore, in line with motivational
theories framed within the basic psychological framework of categorisation, this paper has not only complemented the
existing taxonomies, but has also offered a more conceptually robust alternative for grouping cybercrime: the TCF. It has
argued that cybercrime can be motivated three possible ways: socioeconomic, psychosocial and geopolitical. Whilst what
constitutes cybercrime in most Western nations such the UK and the USA may involve these three groups, cybercrime in
Nigeria is fundamentally rooted in socioeconomics. Therefore, the conceptual ‘pipelines’ of the cybercrime framework in the
Global North may not hold water in Nigeria e representing the Sub-Saharan region. Drawing together and extending cate-
gories of cybercrime, this article has provided a more holistic taxonomy incorporating socioeconomic, psychosocial and
geopolitical motivations. This contribution offers new ways of making sense of numerous variances of cybercrime listed in
Table 1. It also provides a clearer way of conceptualising cybercrime in Nigeria and elsewhere because jurisdictional cultures
and nuances apply online as they do ofﬂine.
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